

(This draft was prepared for the workshop on “Trade unions, free trade and the problem of transnational solidarity” at the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice, University of Nottingham, 2 – 3 December 2011)

The ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) and its Implications for the Global Political Economy and the Politics of the Organized Labour

Dr. Mi Park

Dalhousie University

Introduction

As of June 2011, countries around the world have signed 199 Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) (JETRO, October, 2011). Among the signed FTAs, the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) is particularly noteworthy because of its potentially transformative implications for the current global economic order. While ACFTA is one of a few existing regional free trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, 1993), the European Union (EU, 1993), and the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR, 1991) of South America, it is of critical importance to the organized labour since the China-led free trade area engenders a pole of Asian regional economic order and consequently a multi-polar global order, one in which China plays a central role in the future of global economy.

The objectives of this paper are three-fold. First, it seeks to understand the characteristics of free trade agreements in Asia with a particular focus on ACFTA and its impact on the global governance system of trade and the interstate relations. The second objective of this paper is to explore how the

changing global order affects the politics of capital and the organized labour around the globe. Third, it seeks to understand labour's alternatives to neoliberal free trade and identify future challenges that workers around the world face in pursuit for transnational solidarity. To meet these objectives, the paper is organized as follows. First, it sketches out the impacts of ACFTA on the global economy especially in the area of intra-regional trade, regional currencies, and trade related political landscape. Second, it examines how trade unions have responded to free trade in general and ACFTA in particular. Third, it analyzes alternative trade policies suggested by trade unions and identifies areas of contention and challenges that the labour movements face in order to build solidarity of workers across national borders.

Impacts of ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) on the Global Economy

In 2002, China and the 10-member Association of South East Asia Nations (ASEAN) signed an FTA and its full effect came into force in 2010. ACFTA covers the world's biggest free trade area with 1.7 billion people and over US\$ 2 trillion (as of 2007) combined GDP (Hsiao and Yang, 4 Dec, 2008). In 2015, four other Asian countries (Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam) will join the economic bloc. Irrevocably, ACFTA has accelerated the Asian regional integration process. Already, Japan and Korea followed China's lead by signing similar FTAs with ASEAN. With a growing trade volume among Asian countries, Asia's traditional dependency on the US and Europe as its final export market has weakened. This deepening Asian regional integration process has engendered a multipolar global order that will likely see the emergence of multi-regional currencies, instead of US dollar as the only international reserve currency. A growing acceptance of Chinese yuan as a means of trade payment is indicative of the changing global order. These developments, accelerated by the financial crises since 2008, seem to amplify two contradictory political positions in the developed countries, that is, neoliberal market expansionism and selective trade protectionism. Although the trends outlined above are still in

their making, the China-led economic integration in Asia has made discernable impacts on the politics of nation states, various factions of the capitalist class within, and the working class. In the following section, I will flesh out the above arguments with supporting evidence.

1. ACFTA has accelerated the Asian regional integration process.

It is argued that the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 served as a catalyst for the regional integration process in Asia. In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997, leaders of Asian countries, suffered in the hands of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and US self-serving policies, toyed with the idea of creating an East Asia FTA (EAFTA) that would involve ASEAN+3 (China, Japan, and South Korea) (Pomfret, 2006). But due to rivalry between China, Japan, and South Korea, the EAFTA did not materialize (Park M, 2009; Yu HJ, 2010). Despite the set-back, China took the lead in forging a free trade area by signing an FAT with ASEAN in 2002. Since then, there seems to be no turning back to the old regional order that was characterized by many Asian countries' strategic alliances with the USA.

China's active involvement in FTAs can be seen as a long term development strategy by Chinese government. China, like many other Asian countries, professes the need to diversify its markets and to move away from its over-dependence on the markets of developed countries. From the perspective of short-term export gains, ACFTA is not so beneficial to China since China, a major importer in the region, continues to have large trade deficits with most ASEAN countries. As of 2005, Southeast Asia reported a trade surplus of US\$8 billion per year with China (Economy, 2005: 414). But from the perspective of market diversification and resource security, ACFTA benefits China in the long run. Southeast Asia has important resources (such as Indonesia's oil and natural gas, Malaysia's oil and rubber and tin, the Philippines' palm oil and metals) that China needs in order to continue its economic growth (Hsiao and Yang, 4 Dec, 2008). To forge a strategic long-term alliance with the resource rich countries, China

spends millions dollars in building industrial infrastructures necessary to link ASEAN to China. This includes China’s financing of infrastructure and capacity building programs including reconstruction projects in Burma and the transportation links between Cambodia, Thailand and Singapore (Hsiao and Yang, 4 Dec, 2008). Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that China now surpasses the US as a source of foreign aid in ASEAN. Already, as of 2002, China's aid to Indonesia was double that of the United States. By 2006, China's aid to the Philippines and Laos was four times and three times that of the United States respectively (Hsiao and Yang, 4 Dec, 2008). According to the Forbe, an international business magazine, “two Chinese policy banks lent more to emerging markets in 2009 and 2010 than the World Bank” did (Perkowski, 2011).

As a result of growing trade between China and ASEAN since 2002, as shown in table 1, China became the biggest trade partner of ASEAN as of 2010, followed by EU and Japan. With the completion of ACFTA, China moved on to sign an Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with Taiwan in 2010 and continue to seek to bring more countries into the expanding trade network around China. Worried about China’s growing influence in Southeast Asia, Japan and South Korea subsequently struck a similar deal with ASEAN (Liu, 16 May, 2008).

Table 1. ASEAN Trade by selected partner country, 2009 (as of 15 July 2010)

Country/Region	Total Share to ASEAN trade (%)
ASEAN	24.5
China	11.6
EU	11.2
Japan	10.5
US	9.7
Republic of Korea	4.9

Source: ASEAN Statistics (www.asean.org/stat/Table19.pdf)

Given that Japan enjoys trade surplus with most countries in Asia, Japan is eager to take advantage of the ASEAN's tightening trade networks around China. Since Japan signed an FTA with most ASEAN countries by 2008, more than half of Japan's exports now go to Asian countries (JETRO, October, 2011: 42). Likewise, following China's lead, South Korea also signed an FTA with ASEAN in 2007. As a result, ASEAN, previously South Korea's fifth largest trade partner, became the second largest as of 2011. (China Daily, 3 May, 2011) Since the signing of ACFTA, other countries (Australia, New Zealand, and India) jumped on the FTA bandwagon by signing a similar agreement with ASEAN. Indeed, the ASEAN+1 FTAs (with Japan, China, Korea, Australia, New Zealand and India, respectively) all came into force in 2010 (JETRO, October 2011: 31). Notwithstanding the limitation of Asian inter-regional trade¹, it is significant to note that the ASEAN+6 intra-regional trade ratio is now greater than that of NAFTA (JETRO, October 2011: 31).

Inter-regional trade among ASEAN and East Asian countries including Hong Kong and Taiwan has been increasing over the last two decades. China's share of trade among Asian countries is remarkable if we note that since 2004, China has replaced the United States as the largest trading partner of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and India. (Wang, Aug 26, 2009; Yu HJ, 2010: 12) According to the trade intensity index (exports) of 2000 and 2010, the relationships of Asian countries with the U.S. became weaker while those with China stronger (JETRO, October, 2011: 10). The three countries, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have almost 22 percent of the world's total population and account for 20% of the world's total economic output (China daily, 4 March, 2011). Given the relatively

¹ Baldwin and Carpenter note that "much of the intra-regional trade is 'caused' by the extra-regional exports" in the sense that intra-regional trade and investment in Asia ultimately aim toward exports to the EU and North America (2009: 2).

heavy economic weight of the three Asian countries, it is not surprising that policy makers and trade experts of the three countries are now working on plans to set up an East Asia Free Trade area in the future. This is not an easy, straightforward task though. There are many obstacles to the creation of EAFTA. Traditional rivalry between China, Japan, and South Korea will complicate the FTA process as Chinese and many Asian countries, due to their colonial experience under Japan's occupation, are unlikely to accept a Japan led Asian economic bloc. Another obstacle to EAFTA would be South Korea's reluctance to enter into an FTA with Japan, given Korea's persistent trade deficit with Japan and Japan's relative strength in medium and high-tech manufactured goods that "Korea is counting on for its future growth" (Baldwin and Carpenter, 2009: 8). From Japan's perspective, the ASEAN+3 agreement is less desirable than the ASEAN+6 because the former is likely to be dominated by China while the latter (that includes India, Australia, and New Zealand) will have enough political allies to counter China's influence (Solis, 2011). Notwithstanding many obstacles to EAFTA, it is noteworthy that the current financial crises of the developed countries, such as those in the US and Europe, seem to work in favour of the creation of Asian regional economic bloc.

FTA talks between the three East Asian countries have gained a further momentum as the EU and the USA are currently in deep financial turmoil. Like with the Asian Financial crisis of 1997, the financial crises of Europe and the USA further reinforce the perception among many Asian countries that they need to diversify their markets by expanding inter-regional trade in Asia instead of overly-relying on the European and American markets (Yu HJ, 2010: 13). According to the China Daily, Asian countries use "a free-trade strategy to reduce reliance on the demand from developed nations" (China Daily, 16 March, 2011). In fact, the financial crisis of 2008 has accelerated the regional integration around China as many ASEAN countries including Cambodia, Laos, and the Philippines "have called upon China to invest more in ASEAN to stabilize the economic growth of the region" (Hsiao and Yang, 4 Dec, 2008). To reduce adverse impacts of the European and American financial crisis on Asia, free

trade option to create the East Asia Free Trade Agreement (EAFTA) is gaining further currency among policy makers. As Yi Xiaozhun, vice-minister of commerce in China, states: "The financial crisis has made us aware of the huge risks if we continuously bet on the US and the EU to spur exports. So, a regional FTA that could help boost the foreign trade and investment of the three nations, and reduce reliance on Western markets, is a way out." (China Daily, 2 December, 2010)

2. A Multi-polar global order: ACFTA and the Chinese currency

The growth of intra-regional trade in Asia and the tightening trade networks around China make it possible for the Chinese currency to emerge as a regional trade currency (Yu HJ, 2010:12). Some scholars such as Arvind Subramanian (2011) even predict that the Chinese yuan would become the world's dominant currency within a decade. The increasing strength of the yuan status in the international market will further undermine the current economic order based on US dollar as the reserve currency. There are many examples that support the above contention.

Three East Asian countries, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea, possess about 47 percent of the world's total foreign exchange reserves as of 2011 (China Daily, March 4, 2011). The three countries are collectively unhappy with their situation extremely vulnerable to external fiscal shocks coming from uncertainty and volatility of the US dollar. They are worried about the falling value of US dollar as monetary expansionist policies of the US government push further down the value of the global reserve currency (Li, 2011:135). Against this backdrop, China supports the IMF's Special Drawing Right (SDR) that would be available to emerging economies as a means of trade balance settlement (Zattler, 2010). Meantime, China, like Japan and South Korea, seeks to diversify its foreign currency reserve by obtaining Euros and Japanese yen. At the moment, Chinese currency as trade payment currency takes up only 0.15% of all global trade while US dollar shares 42.5% and the Euro 19.5%. However, HSBC

predicts that within 3-5 years, Chinese yuan will be one of the three main international currencies (Bang HC, 24 April, 2011). According RT, a Russian News agency, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission reports to the US Congress that the Chinese yuan is very likely to replace the US dollar within a decade (RT, 18 November, 2011). Already, the Chinese yuan is increasingly becoming an accepted method for trade payment. For instance, Russia and China agreed to use each other's currency for payment of trade (Yonhap News, 25 June, 2011). As of December 2011, China and Japan made an agreement to promote direct yuan-yen trade without converting to US dollars. Bloomberg editorials note this agreement as "a small, but notable, step toward a new global economy" (Dec 28, 2011). China is also considering a plan to set up a regional bank that settles China-ASEAN trade in Chinese yuan (Perkowski, 2011). Additionally, regional economic integrations in the Middle East and Latin America are accompanied by the use of regional or non-US dollar currencies as a means of payment. For instance, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), consisting of middle-eastern oil-producing countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), seeks to create a common regional currency. And Brazil and Argentina, the main axis of MERCOSUR South America's common market, are expanding the use of their own currencies in bilateral trade (Hwang, 2010: 7). These moves to reduce US dollar dependency will further weaken US dollar's global status. Given that the USA and the Euro zone are troubled by sovereign debt crises, demands for Chinese currency will further increase.

Some scholars argue that China's growth is overestimated and that China merely occupies the bottom of the international production value chain. I disagree with the argument. China's growth is remarkable not only in low value added products such as textile, footwear, and toys but also in high value added sectors. As of 2003, a 41 percent share of China's total exports comes from machinery

(including FDI led electronics)² and transport equipment (Yue, 2006: 112). Although electronic goods of the Japanese and South Korean origin are largely assembled in China, this should not mean that China is a merely global factory supported by cheap labour. China makes “massive investment in cutting-edge infrastructure like smart grids” and produces plug-in hybrid electronic vehicles as of 2010 (Lee SH, 2010). China is also among the world's top five countries in the R&D-intensive bio-industry. As China is making a remarkable progress in cutting edge technology and high-value products, China is now the world’s largest producer of wind turbines and the second largest in solar cell production (supplying 43.2 % of the global solar cells). Four Chinese companies are ranked as one of top 10 solar cell companies in the world (Lee SH, 2010).


The rise of China together with emerging economies such as India, Brazil and South Africa is already having an impact on the global governance system. After the collapse of USSR, the US was the only global superpower with the G7 functioning as the “supreme consultative body, deliberating on policy agendas proposed by the US and extending international legitimacy there of” (Park HS, 2010: 7). This is changing. Now, the G20 and the G2 (the US and China), rather than the G7, are considered to be the real venue for international economic cooperation. Seen in this way, China’s growth and the emergence of regional economic blocs around the globe may enable emerging economies to bargain for a better position in the global economy (Park HS, 2010; Hwang, 2010).

² Chia Siow Yue, Senior Research Fellow Singapore Institute of International Affairs, notes that foreign and joint enterprises account for 80 percent of China’s electronics exports (Yue, 2006: 113). According to JETRO, the foreign companies in China include: electronics (Philips), heavy electrical machinery (Siemens), automobiles (Volkswagen), Samsung Electronics.

3. *This dynamic of global capitalism seems to amplify two contradictory but often complementary political forces in the developed countries, namely, market expansionism and selective trade protectionism.*

As shown in figure 2, US trade imbalance (US trade deficit with China, Canada, Germany, Japan, and oil exporting countries) together with the current financial crisis tends to strengthen two political tendencies, that is, trade protectionism and neoliberal market expansionism. Cases for trade protectionism have risen in recent years as trade disputes between China, the US and the EU have increased. Between 2009 and 2010, the US and the EU have “launched an unprecedented number of investigations into Chinese exports” with regard to anti-dumping measures (China Daily, 2 December, 2010). Since the financial crisis of 2008, many Americans tend to blame China for their economic woes. Fuelling the anti-Chinese sentiment, many right-wing populist politicians in Washington use China as a scapegoat for growing domestic unemployment and trade imbalance. For instance, the US Senate is seeking a legal way to impose sanctions on China if China refuses to appreciate its currency value at the level US desires.

Figure 2. U.S. Trade Balances with the World and Various Trading Partners: 2010



Source: Morrison (2011) Congressional Research Service

Growing protectionist sentiments in the developed countries do not necessarily translate to the rejection of neoliberal globalization. On the contrary, many governments exploit nationalist sentiments as a political tool to pressure trade partners to make concessions in selected areas under trade negotiation. Side by side with trade protectionism, there exists the idea that in order to fuel growth, it is vital to tap into the potential of emerging economies like China, Brazil and India. In this regards, the leaders of G7 press for market liberalization rather than trade protectionism as a way to escape from the current global economic conundrum. Placed in this context, the current flurry of FTA negotiations between the EU and the USA on one hand and emerging economies in Asia on the other take on a new geo-political meaning. The EU competes with the USA over the access to the Asian market. With South Korea, as the first Asian country to sign an FTA with the EU in 2010, the EU hopes to use the Korea-EU FTA to gain a foothold into the rest of the Asia market (Lee et al., 2010:5). For South Korea, an FTA with the EU means a larger market share. The European Union, surpassing USA, became the second largest importer of Korea's manufactured goods in 2005 (Lee et al., 2010). On the whole, trade between EU-Asia is on the rise while Asia's dependence on US as an export market is in decline.

To counter the growing influence of China in Asia, the US signed an FTA with South Korea in 2007 but civic opposition from both countries delayed the ratification until late 2011. The Kor-US FTA is a clear example of the US trade policy in the region as the USA opposes any "trade blocs that could harm US geostrategic interests and weaken its political influence in the region (by effectively displacing the United States in favour of a regional hegemon, that is, China)" (Solis, 2011:1). Not surprisingly then, currently, the USA is negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement with eight countries (Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam). TPPA and the

contentious US-ROK FTA are clearly geopolitical moves with which the USA seeks to counter growing influence of China in the region. As Prof. Kelsey argues, TPP is a “lynchpin of the US anti-China strategy” (Kelsey, 2011).

Some scholars attribute the proliferation of FTAs to a capitalist economic logic that developed countries seek to offset the declining rate of profit stemming from higher investment in constant composition of capital (advanced technology) relative to the variable composition of capital (workers wages). Characterising free trade as a mechanism of ‘unequal exchange,’ some scholars further argue that developing countries are “locked into a situation” (Bieler, Ciccaglione, Hilary, 2010: 24-25) where development of less advanced countries are hampered due to transfer of surplus values to developed countries. Seeing FTA in this light, many believe that trade unions’ differing position on FTAs may reflect the reality that FTAs mainly benefit workers in the developed countries while disadvantaging workers in the South (Bieler, Ciccaglione, Hilary, 2010: 4). Although I largely agree with this argument, this approach may miss equally important geo-political factors behind the FTA drive. As shown in the above discussion of the ASEAN-China FTA and its subsequent FTA frenzy in Asia, free trade should not be narrowly conceptualized as an inevitable outcome of uneven development of capitalism. FTAs in Asia can be conceptualized as a form of strategic capacity building so that developing countries reduce their over-dependency on the EU and the USA. In this equation, a critical factor is the role of the “developmental” state which is missing in many analyses of FTAs. The rise of Japan, South Korea, and now China as regional economic powers can’t be fully explained without a reference to the role of the developmental state. As Zweig points out, the developmental state in China has made concerted efforts to upgrade China’s industrial structure so that China can move up the ladder of international hierarchy of production and division of labour (Zweig, 2010:38).

Labour’s Differing views on ACFTA and FTAs in Asia

The sheer number of China's population (1.3 billion) and the size of its economy (the second largest in the world) understandably provoke mixed reactions. Some consider an FTA with China as an opportunity while others see it as a threat. Since China is the biggest importer of most Asian countries, business communities in ASEAN welcomed ACFTA. Especially with the growing domestic purchasing power of China as the number of the middle class and their consumption level increase, some ASEAN businesses expect that ACFTA would further fuel imports of consumer goods as well as raw material from ASEAN. This was evidenced by the growing number of Chinese travellers to ASEAN region. It is noted that in 2007, for the first time more Chinese tourists (3.4 million) than Japanese counterparts visited Southeast Asia (Hsiao and Yang, 4 Dec, 2008).

On the other hand, China's competitive advantage in labour intensive areas is perceived to be a threat to some industrial sectors in Asia. Concerns have been raised on behalf of workers in the medium and small size business in some manufacturing sectors, small farmers, and fishers in ASEAN. Bello argues that Southeast Asia is used as a "dumping ground for China's extremely competitive industrial and agricultural sectors" and that "China's growth has in part taken place at Southeast Asia's expense with FDI moving out of relatively high wage Southeast Asia toward China "(Bello, 12 March, 2010). Bello predicts that ACFTA will reproduce "the old colonial division of labour, whereby it receives low-value-added natural resources and agricultural products and sends to the Southeast Asian economies high-value added manufactured goods" (Bello, 12 March, 2010). The FTA Watch in Thailand claims that due to the FTA with China, a hundred thousand Thai farming families went bankrupt due to the massive influx of cheaper Chinese agricultural productions (FTA Watch, October 2007). Concerned about real and potential job losses, thousands of Indonesian workers affiliated with the Association of Bandung Leather and Textile Workers and the Association of Indonesian Labour Union took to the

streets to protest against ACFTA (Suwarni, 2010). Similarly, many Taiwanese workers oppose the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) between China-Taiwan on the ground that it would destroy small-medium business in Taiwan and that it would deepen Taiwan's dependence on the Mainland China (AFP, 5 January, 2010).

Notwithstanding these local protests against ACFTA, it should be noted that many trade unions in Asia did not actively oppose ACFTA. By and large, most trade unions in Asia take either a conciliatory or rejectionist approach to free trade. Trade unions that advocate a social dialogue or a social partnership with businesses tend to take a conciliatory approach to free trade. They do not actively put up a resistance to free trade and instead demand for the inclusion of a social chapter into FTAs as a means to mitigate adverse impact of free trade on workers and local economies. Unions that belong to this category in Asia are: Japanese Trade Union Confederation (JTUC-Rengo), the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP), Singapore National Trade Unions Congress (NTUC), Malaysian Trade Union Congress (MTUC) and the ASEAN Trade Union Council (ATUC)³. Trade unions that take a rejectionist approach to free trade tend to be left-leaning trade unions such as the Korean Confederation of Trade Union (KCTU), National Workers Union in Indonesia (NWU), and the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) of the Philippines. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) does not have a clear (either for or against FTA) position on FTAs. Although China has signed 8 FTAs (ASEAN, Pakistan, Chile, New Zealand, Singapore, Peru), ACFTU's *Work Objectives Put forward by ACFTU for the Year 2011* does not even once mention the issue of free trade (ACFTU, 31 January, 2011).

³ ATUC, formed in 1996, is made up of trade unions from 15 countries including TUCP of the Philippines, MTUC of Malaysia, and trade unions of Singapore, Indonesia, and Vietnam (Kang CH, 2005: 15). ATUC has total 15 million members (<http://aseantuc.org/about-us/>)

Working closely with the Asian Development Bank, the ASEAN Trade Union Council supported FTAs. Japan's RENGO considers FTAs as "unavoidable for Japan" and thus seeks to play an active role in making trade rules fair for workers (Chan, 2008: 88). Although generally supportive of free trade, many trade unions oppose the liberalization of certain economic sectors that negatively affect their union constituencies. Thus, the Japanese public sector union group Zendoren is strongly against FTTPA (Kelsey, 2011). The Trade Union Congress of the Philippines is supportive of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) while Japanese RENGO is opposed. With the ASEAN-Korea FTA, Korean Confederation of Trade Union (KCTU) did not mobilize its rank-and-file members to oppose the deal. The KCTU's relatively acquiescent stance toward ASEAN is sharply contrasted to its vehement opposition to the FTA with the USA. Contrast to less politicized FTAs with emerging economies in Asia, bilateral trade negotiations with the global economic powers such the USA and Japan have caused more mass protests across Asia.

In contrast to Asian trade unions that showed concerns but did not actively oppose FTAs with ASEAN and China, trade unions in Australia and New Zealand highlighted an FTA with China as a major threat to their economies. Furthermore, it is discernable that they often use a China-bashing, "human rights" discourse to defend their selective trade protectionism. Some unions in Australia and New Zealand admonish China for violating labour rights. Portraying China as a totalitarian terror state exploiting its citizens for global dominance, unions in Australia and New Zealand opposed an FTA with China. Dean Mighell, Secretary of the Electrical Trades Union, accuses China for an unfair trade practice such as depreciating its currency and lowering wages through suppression of workers' rights (Mighell, 2009). Similarly, the Green Party of New Zealand echoes the same charges against China, citing China's suppression of workers' rights, disregard of environmental standards and the use of prisoner and child labour (Greens, 2008). The Green Party further warns that the manufacturing sector of New Zealand will be hollowed out and that China with its large trade surplus money will take over New Zealand firms. The

Green Party further states that migrant Chinese workers (less paid, less qualified) in New Zealand will undermine workers' rights by putting downward pressure on wages and working conditions in New Zealand (Greens, 2008).

This anti-China line is indeed the official line of AFL-CIO. The official website of AFL-CIO Now Blog News is full of anti-China articles that accuse China for stealing jobs, causing trade deficit, manipulating currency exchange rate, and exploiting workers (<http://blog.aflcio.org/tag/china/>). According to AFL-CIO, China is an unfair trade nation by making its goods cheap through its artificially undervalued currency and this unfair trade practice accounts for US trade deficit and job loss in America. (Hall, 2011) To force China to change its monetary policy, AFL-CIO asked the US government to enforce trade laws such as Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act of 2011 (Hall, 2011; AFL-CIO, 2011). The AFL-CIO, together with the National Association of Manufacturers, hopes that with China's depreciated currency, China's exports would decrease (Luce & Bonacich, 2009:155). What AFL-CIO does not mention though is that since China is the second biggest importer in the world (according to 2009 WTO statistics), devalued Chinese currency would mean more import related payments and thus less trade surplus for China. Another equally important fact that escapes the attention of many China-bashing American labour activists is that it was the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai that fiercely opposed Chinese government's new *Labour Contract Law*, which has been in force since 2008. Although the new law provides better protection for millions of Chinese workers, the American Chamber of Commerce opposed it because it would increase labour costs for American TNCs in China (Hu and Levesque, 2011: 80-81). Like many right wing populists in the USA often scapegoat China for its economic decline and financial crises, many labour groups in some OECD countries are supportive of their "humanitarian" imperialist governments that use "human rights" as a political tool to perpetuate power inequality in the international relations (e.g., Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya).

Table 3: China's Trade with the World, 2001-10 (\$ billion)

Notes: *Calculated by USCBC. PRC exports reported on a free-on-board basis; imports on a cost, insurance, and freight basis.
Source: PRC National Bureau of Statistics

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Exports	266.1	325.6	438.2	593.3	762.0	968.9	1,217.8	1,430.7	1,201.6	1,577.9
% change*	6.8	22.4	34.6	35.4	28.4	27.2	25.7	17.5	-16.0	31.3
Imports	243.6	295.2	412.8	561.2	660.0	791.5	956.0	1,132.6	1,005.9	1,394.8
% change*	8.2	21.2	39.8	35.9	17.6	19.9	20.8	18.5	-11.2	38.7
Total	509.7	620.8	851.0	1,154.6	1,421.9	1,760.4	2,173.7	2,563.3	2,207.5	2,972.8
% change*	7.5	21.8	37.1	35.7	23.2	23.8	23.5	17.9	-13.9	34.7
Balance	22.6	30.4	25.5	32.1	102.0	177.5	261.8	298.1	195.7	183.1

(Source: The US-China Business Council. <https://www.uschina.org/statistics/tradetable.html>)

Table 4: China's Top Import Suppliers, 2010 (\$ billion)

Source: PRC General Administration of Customs, *China's Customs Statistics*

Rank	Country/region	Volume	% change over 2009
1	Japan	176.7	35.0
2	South Korea	138.4	35.0
3	Taiwan	115.7	35.0
4	United States	102.0	31.7
5	Germany	74.3	33.4
6	Australia	60.9	54.1
7	Malaysia	50.4	55.9
8	Brazil	38.1	34.7
9	Thailand	33.2	33.3
10	Saudi Arabia	32.8	39.2

(Source: The US-China Business Council. <https://www.uschina.org/statistics/tradetable.html>)

Selective trade protectionism, partly motivated by economic nationalism and mainly by workers' concerns for job security, dominates the discourse of many trade unions in the USA and Canada. Opposing trade deals with South Korea, AFL-CIO demands that US government should "stop exporting good jobs overseas" (AFL-CIO (2011)). Likewise, for the same reason, CAW opposes free trade with China, Japan, and South Korea. CAW argues that a trade is "fair" only if trading partners have a balanced import-export relationship with each other. Hence, CAW argues that "Any expansion of Korean vehicle sales in Canada must be tied to Korean purchases of equivalent volumes of North

American-made automotive products, so that our overall automotive trade balance with Korea does not deteriorate further (CAW, December, 2005).

From the above discussion, the politics of organized labour largely mirrors the politics of capital in their respective countries. Some businesses, vulnerable to added competition from abroad, ally with the organized labour to oppose particular aspects of FTAs. Conservative unions in Asia like ATUC and Japanese RENGO support free trade, together with state actors and large business groups with competitive advantage in Asia. It is discernable that left-leaning trade unions in ASEAN and South Korea are most vehemently opposed to FTAs with the global economic powers such as USA and Japan but, despite showing some concerns, largely remain acquiescent to FTAs with ASEAN and China. As for trade unions in North America, the EU, Australia, and New Zealand, although largely supportive of market expansionism, they oppose free trade with China, South Korea, and Japan at this time.

As shown above, in so far as FTA is perceived to increase competition among workers, workers in less competitive sectors are likely to voice opposition. Concerns for job security cut across both developed and developing countries. In response to perceived as well as actual job loss due to FTAs, unions have frequently argued for protectionism to keep jobs in *their* countries. In this context, it is not surprising that transnational labour solidarity is only based on the lowest common denominator, that is, an opposition to free trade. Although many trade unions advocate a fair trade instead of neoliberal free trade, it is not at all clear what a fair trade means to countries at varying levels of development and to workers who are pitted against each other over employment and job security. To explore the politics of organized labour concerning FTAs, the following section discusses alternative trade policies suggested by trade unions and labour think tanks. It seeks to examine whether and to what extent the politics of organized labour is different from a right-wing populist nationalist politics.

Alternatives to Neoliberal FTAs and Challenges for Transnational Labour Solidarity

Many suggestions have been made by trade unionists to counter neoliberal forms of free trade. Some major policy alternatives include: the inclusion of social chapters, nations' rights' to non-tariff barriers, and alternative regionalism. This section discusses limitations of the suggested alternatives and points out some challenges that the international labour movement faces in its pursuit for transnational labour solidarity.

* **Social Chapter:** Many conservative unions affiliated with the Global Trade Union federations, International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC)⁴, the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), ASEAN Trade Union Council, and the AFL-CIO advocate the inclusion of a Social Chapter into trade agreements, as a means to protect workers' rights (Kang CH, 2005: 11). They also call for institutional mechanisms for trade related public consultation involving trade unions. This position, however, does not represent the views of many dissenting unions within. For instance, although ITUC's official position is for the inclusion of social chapter, ITUC affiliates have differing views on FTAs. For instance, KCTU, an ITUC affiliate, is critical of the social chapter position, while Japanese RENGO, also an ITUC affiliate, holds a pro-social chapter position (Chan, 2008: 88). This internal disagreement shows an asymmetry of power within the organization, in which business friendly trade unions have greater influence on ITUC policies.

The strategy of embedding a social chapter (social clauses) in free trade agreements has been criticized by many. Critiques point out that social clauses are powerless without a strong enforcing

⁴ The International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) includes the affiliates of the ICFTU, the World Confederation of Labour, representing 180 million workers in 157 countries (http://www.global-unions.org/IMG/pdf/MakingWorldDifference_4.pdf).

mechanism and that they are rarely enforced. Trade agreements such as NAFTA, CAFTA (Central America Free Trade Agreement), Mecosur, and ASEAN, *do contain* social chapters but so far, those social chapters fail to protect workers' rights. Even AFL-CIO, one of the strong social chapter advocates, do not have power (or the political will) to enforce the ILO standards in their own country, the USA. Certain US labour laws such as a "permanent replacement" doctrine (allowing scabs to replace striking workers) and "Secondary boycott" laws (prohibiting a solidarity strike in secondary companies) violate the ILO core labour rights such as the right to strike and the freedom of association. Not to mention, the growing sweatshops involving child labour in many US cities and the use of prisoners for commercial production in the US (Solidarity Center, 2008: 117) are a clear case of violating ILO labour standards. As a side note, this poor record of protecting workers' rights in the USA make the AFL-CIO's criticisms of China sound like shameful double standards.

Additionally, many critiques point out that the pro-social chapter position underplays the significance of power asymmetry in the inter-state relations. In fact, when social clauses are called into action, they are routinely used only for the advancement of geopolitical or protectionist goals of the economically powerful countries. Criticisms of the Social Chapter as a geo-political tool is equally underlined by the Solidarity Center, a US based labour research center. It found that many American and European laws⁵ that tied trade related benefits to political governance, especially the protection of workers' rights, have been so far used as a means to reward political allies, despite the fact that the core

⁵ The examples of such laws are the US Generalized System of Preferences (1974, 1984, 1996, 2001), the European GSP (1971, 1998, 2006), the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (1988) and African Growth and Opportunity Act (2000) (Solidarity Center , 2008).

rights stipulated in the ILO convention were intended to secure the protection of workers' rights in order for beneficiary countries (developing countries) to obtain tariff reductions or trade related benefits (Solidarity Center, 2008).

* **Non-tariff barriers (NTBs):** ICFTU stresses the right of a nation to enforce its own non-tariff barriers (NTBs) that are “legitimate measures to ensure the security and safety of products, such as regulations regarding packaging and information on dangerous substances like chemicals.” (ICFTU, January 2008:20) In this regard, it is important to note that FTAs are not all the same and thus do not necessarily result in a uniformed outcome in which labour and environment in the less competitive sectors and countries are mercilessly wracked by TNCs. Even in the absence of tariff measures to protect domestic industries, countries can resort to non-tariff barriers (NTBs) such as regulations concerning health, environment, and labour related standards. For instance, EU-Korea FTA, despite the abolition of tariff, non-tariff barriers (such as technical and environment standards) are still enforced (Lee et al., 2010:10-12). Additionally, if countries opt out from the WTO procurement agreement, they can support certain local industries through government policies that favour domestic businesses or reward ecological or technologically innovative companies. China is the case in point. China uses “indigenous innovation policies that “give preference to locally developed technology” and what that means is that “American companies that seek Chinese government contracts must share their technology with Chinese companies” (Solis, 2011: 14). Unlike “toothless” social clauses in trade agreements, NTBs and government procurement provision can be directly enforced by the regulatory bodies at local and national levels.

The official position of ICFTU on NTBs, however, does not represent many dissenting unions within. Trade unions that support *their* country's right to NTBs do not necessarily support *other* countries' rights to NTBs. This double standard is clearly shown in the case of US trade unions with

TPPA. Regarding negotiations for Japan's admission to TPPA, the US Steelworkers Union demands "an agreement that includes Japan must have provisions to ensure true reciprocity is achieved, not just by lowering tariffs, but through real market access as well as elimination of non-tariff barriers." (Kelsey, 2011) Another example is the case of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA). Trade Union Congress of the Philippines supports it because they believe that it will open up employment opportunities for Filipino workers in Japan. (Bilaterals.org, 9 March 2008) In contrast, RENGO, a Japanese counter part, supports Japan's right to NTBs (Japanese regulations on health care professionals) as a means to keep domestic jobs for Japanese workers. As RENGO states, "With regard to exclusive occupations, such as medical doctors, nurses and attorneys, who are required to obtain state-certified qualifications to work as professionals, the mutual recognition of qualifications between countries, which is now being discussed in FTA/EPA talks, should not be permitted. If foreigners wish to engage in professional services with exclusivity rules, they should be required to acquire the necessary qualifications under relevant Japanese laws." (JTUC, no date)

* **Alternative Regionalism:** The social chapter position is argued by business friendly trade unions that seek an ongoing social dialogue with capital and governments as well as international bodies such as ILO, WTO and the World Bank (ICFTU, 9 Nov, 2011; Kang CH, 2005: 12). In contrast, others see a better future for the global South if likeminded governments form an economic bloc to protect local economies. They include some trade unions in Africa and Latin America and activists affiliated with research institutes such as the Focus on the Global South, the Transnational Institute (TNI), and the La Via Campesina (the largest international farmers' organization). Examples of alternative regionalism of this sort would be the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), UNASUR (the Union of the Nations of South America) and Alternatives to Neoliberalism in Southern Africa (ANSA). For instance, the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) is a non-profit seeking trade agreement among

Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua and a few more Latin American countries. So under this agreement, countries exchange goods and services for the purpose of improving the living standards of the poor and marginalized. They share intellectual, financial, and cultural resources through joint seed banks, a pro-indigenous cultural TV channel (Telesur), and the Bank of ALBA. The regional development funds such as the bank of ALBA help poor farmers and small medium businesses to foster the vitalization of local economies (Park M, forthcoming). Another example for alternative regionalism is ANSA. ANSA was developed by the Southern Africa Trade Union Coordination Council (SATUCC), the African Labour Research Network (ALRN), and the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZiCTU). Rejecting the current neoliberal form of free trade, ANSA call for “protective tariffs and import controls in order to support its infant industries” until “technological, institutional and knowledge gaps between developing countries and industrialized countries have been closed” (ANSA no date:6). Equally important to ANSA are import substitution strategies and intra-African regional trade, which promote domestic and regional markets in a complementary manner (ANSA no date:7). The proponents of ANSA hope that the regional economic powers such as South Africa and Mauritius play an active role in implementing this strategy (ANSA no date: 7). On the whole, the proponents of alternative economic bloc share the belief that alternative regionalism based on South-South alliances can challenge unequal North-South power relations. However, this position is a hard sell for workers in the developed countries. For the same reasons why NTBs would not be the basis of unity among trade unions around the globe, it is not too difficult to foresee that trade unions in the developed countries are unlikely to support an alternative regionalism that limits exports of *their* countries.

It is true that there have been many joint statements issued by trade unions across national borders that supposedly share the common ground on which they all strive to build a just society. Often, however, the contents of joint statements are merely a wish list of all nice things (like sustainable development and decent job) but lack substance as they fall silent on internal contradictions of and

foreseeable problems with the suggested policy alternatives. The Labour's Platform for the Americas (LPA) is the case in point. LPA was developed by trade union representatives from the Inter-American Regional Workers' Organisation (ORIT), the Andean Labour Consultative Council (CCLA), the Caribbean Congress of Labour (CCL), the Central America and Caribbean Union Coordination (CCSCAC), the Southern Cone Union Coordination (CCSCS) and the national labour centres of Canada, the United States and Mexico. The platform aims to pressure governments to develop social policies that "Pursue Sustainable Development and Focus on Decent Jobs and Full Employment" and "prioritize productive investment and universal public social services to address existing inequalities" (Labour's Platform for the Americas. http://www.fesur.org.uy/common/pdf/PLA_ingles.pdf). But the manifesto falls short of addressing conflicting interests among nations and industries at differing levels of development.

For the suggested policy alternatives to be implemented, they must address conflicting interests between workers across borders as they are forced to enter into competition with each other. Relating to this important task is to build a dialogue between trade unions between the developed and less developed countries to explore a real basis of unity that can advance workers' interests around the world, not only in *their* own countries. In this regard, engaging with the organized labour in China is crucial in forging a transnational solidarity network that can prevent the global race to the bottom. The number of Chinese manufacturing workers alone (109 million) is greater than the one of all G-7 countries (53 million) combined (McNally 2011: 56). It can't be overstated that if transnational solidarity were to have serious impact on the future of global economy, it is needless to say that the international workers movement must engage with China's official trade union, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU). The

ACFTU is criticized for being subordinated to the Chinese government⁶. Despite its lack of autonomy from the state, ACFTU has shown efforts to defend workers' rights in recent years. In 2005, ACFTU made concerted efforts to unionize the Fortune 500 corporations in China and consequently it now has collective bargaining agreements covering 80 percent of those Fortune 500 global companies. ACFTU has successfully fought for the organization of trade unions at all Wall Marts in China (Change to Win, 27 Aug, 2009) and by the end of 2010, ACFTU recruited 8.398 million migrant workers in 2010 (ACFTU, January 2011). The labour movement in China is gaining a critical momentum as some suggest that the Honda workers' strike in 2010 has set "a new stage of labour resistance in China" (<http://www.ituc-csi.org/glu-where-is-the-trade-union.html>). Against this background, Director of the China Labour Bulletin, Han Dongfang, argues that it is vital to work with ACFTU (Han 26 June 2011). Despite many shortcomings of ACFTU, the ACFTU is not a monolithic organization and has shown signs of change. Since China's union represents 20% workforce of the world and for any global union to work, the support of Chinese workers is indispensable for a genuine transformation of global economy (Jung SU, 2008: 79). Therefore, there should be greater efforts to work with ACFTU as well as trade unions in Asia.

Conclusion

⁶ In addition to the official union and progressive labour organizations such as Hong Kong based pro-labour activist group, China Labour Bulletin (<http://www.clb.org.hk/en/>), China Labour Net (<http://worldlabour.org/eng/node/375>), Chinese Workers Research Network (CWRN). there are independent, less organized grass-root workers self-organizations (Smith et al, 2006).

The dynamics of global capitalism is forging a multipolar global order where China becomes one of the leading poles. It is yet to see whether the ASEAN-China FTA or other South-South FTAs can generate progressive social forces that can radically restructure the current global order. In any event, ACFTA seems to provide more opportunities for the “Global South” to diversify its markets by shifting its trade partners away from North America and Europe. China’s rise and the growing South-South regionalism have changed the institutional balance of power by giving the middle-range powers a stronger bargaining position. In this regard, Park HS argues: “The global paradigm, however, will likely be reorganized into a bipolar system that is centered on the US and China after going through a transitional period where a bipolar system co-exists with a multi-polar system” (Park HS, 2010: 7).

In the midst of financial crises and economic downturn, the rise of China together with export-led economies such as Japan and South Korea is seen as a threat to workers in the developed countries. As the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW) put it, “The expansion of low-cost exports from emerging economies, and the subsequent relocation of investment and jobs by profit-seeking companies, poses a real and growing danger to the prosperity of working class Canadians” (CAW, December 2005). Economic nationalism, often accompanied with “humanitarian” concerns about human rights violations in China, seems to dominate the discourse of many trade unions in the developed countries. As a response to perceived or actual job losses due to trade liberalization, trade unions usually turn to trade protectionism. Although offshore outsourcing does contribute to job losses, there are other important factors that account for real job losses. They are labour saving (or displacing) technology and lean production methods including the use of non-standard forms of employment. By making huge reserves of global labour force available to capital, free trades simply amplify these labour displacing forces. What should be workers’ response to these threats? Mere opposition to labour-displacing technology maybe a short term defensive measure but it is fundamentally regressive. In the absence of labour’s transnational response to capitalism and these labour-displacing forces in particular, the prevalence of

trade protectionism in the anti-FTA movements merely reinforce the idea that ‘it is better to be exploited by one’s fellow-countrymen than by foreigners’ (Marx, 1847, quoted in Park M, 2009). Protectionism per se does not prevent capital from using new technology to displace labour unless, as Rifkin (2004) suggests, it is accompanied by work sharing through the reduction of working hours. So far, the suggested alternatives such as the social chapter, NTBs, and alternative regionalism have their own limitations as discussed above. Even with the lack of consensus aside, the suggested routes to achieving such alternatives lack real substance and fail to take into account power inequality in the international relations. Therefore, it is needless to say that there is an urgent need for further critical analyses of alternatives of the organized labour and debates over how a real alternative, one that can genuinely advance the cause of the working class around the world, can be achieved.

References

ACFTU (January 31, 2011) *Work Objectives Put forward by ACFTU for the Year 2011*.

<http://english.acftu.org/template/10002/file.jsp?cid=23&aid=627>

AFL-CIO (2011) *America Wants to Work Action Plan*.

http://www.aflcio.org/issues/jobseconomy/jobs/jobsagenda_2011.cfm

All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) (2011, January 31). *Chinese Trade Unions Makes*

Progress in 2010. <http://english.acftu.org/template/10002/file.jsp?cid=68&aid=621>

ANSA (no date) *Alternatives to Neoliberalism in South Africa*. Chapter 9: Trade and Regional

Integration. <http://www.ansa->

[afrika.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=49&Itemid=61](http://www.ansa-afrika.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=49&Itemid=61)

- Appelbaum, R. P. (2009). Big suppliers in greater China: a growing counterweight to the power of giant retailers, in H. Hung (Ed.), *China and the Transformation of Global Capitalism* (pp.65-173). (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press).
- Asia Monitor Resource Centre (AMRC) (2007, September 28). The Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative and Labour Conditions in Thailand. *Asian Labour Update*.
http://www.amrc.org.hk/alu_article/tncs_and_asian_labour/the_enterprise_for_asean_initiative_and_labour_conditions_in_thailand
- Asia Monitor Resource Centre (AMRC) (n.d.). *AMRC Team*. <http://www.amrc.org.hk/amrc/team>
- Associated Free Press (AFP) (2010, January 5). Taiwan workers protest against planned China deal. *News 352*. <http://hello.news352.lu/edito-38434-taiwan-workers-protest-against-planned-china-deal.html>
- Ba, A. D. (2003). 'China and ASEAN: Renavigating Relations for a 21st-Century Asia'. *Asian Survey*, 43(4), 622–647.
- Baldwin, R. and Carpenter, T. (2009). A 3 Bloc Dance: East Asian regionalism and the North Atlantic Trade Giants. NCCR Trade Regulations. Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research. Working Paper No 2009/33
- Bang, H.-C. (2011, April 24). 방현철위안화 무역결제 1년새 20배 폭증... 주요 도시 허브(거래 중심지) 경쟁. http://biz.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/04/24/2011042401167.html
- Becker, A. (2010, July 2). Europe's crisis is China's opportunity. *Asia Times*.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/LG02Cb01.html
- Becker, A. (2010, Oct 14). China steps up role in Europe. *Asia Times*.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/LJ14Cb01.html

Becker, A. (2010, Oct 5). EU takes on Chinese currency. *Asia Times*.

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/LJ05Cb01.html

Bello, W. (2010, March 12). China lassoes its neighbors. *Asia Times*.

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/LC12Cb01.html

Bieler, A., Ciccaglione, B. & Hilary, J. (2010). 'Transnational solidarity, labour movements and the problem of international free trade', paper presented at the XVII ISA World Congress of Sociology, Gothenburg, Sweden, (11 – 17 July 2010).

http://www.s2bnetwork.org/fileadmin/dateien/downloads/Solidarity_and_Free_Trade_-_ISA_Gothenburg_paper_final.pdf

Bilaterals.org (9 March 2008). TUCP wants Senate to ratify JPEPA.

<http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article11443>)

CAW, (December, 2005). CAW Statement on Canada-Korea Free Trade

<http://www.caw.ca/assets/pdf/StatementonCanadaKoreaFTA.pdf>

Chan, J. (2008). *Another Japan is possible: new social movements and global citizenship education*. (California: Stanford University Press).

Change to Win (2009, August 27). Change to Win, China Trade Unions Sign First Formal Agreement.

<http://www.changetowin.org/news/change-win-china-trade-unions-sign-first-formal-agreement>

Change to Win Coalition. (2011, October 29). *The New York Times*. Retrieved from [http://topics.](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/c/change_to_win_coalition/index.html)

[nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/c/change_to_win_coalition/index.html](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/c/change_to_win_coalition/index.html)

Chavez, J (January 25, 2011) Regional Integration as A Response to Hegemony and the Crisis. Focus on the Global South. <http://www.focusweb.org/content/regional-integration-response-hegemony-and-crisis>

China Daily (2010, December 2). Regional free trade talks 'set for 2012'. *China Daily*.

http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2010-12/02/content_11644048.htm

China Daily (2011, March 4). East Asia's economic integration to be sped up. *China Daily*.

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2011-03/04/content_12118251.htm

China Daily (2011, March, 16). Integration of Asian economies will provide greater benefits. *China*

Daily. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2011bfa/2011-03/16/content_12317623.htm

China Daily (2011, May 31). ASEAN becomes ROK's 2nd largest trade partner. *China Daily*.

http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2011-05/31/content_12621063.htm

De Ville, F. & Orbie J. (2011, April 19). The European Union's Trade Policy Response to the Crisis:

Paradigm lost or reinforced? *European Integration online Papers (EIoP)*, 15(2).

<http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2011-002a.htm>

Desker, B. (2004). In defence of FTAs: from purity to pragmatism in East Asia. *The Pacific Review*,

17(1), 3–26.

Dongfang, H. (2011, June 26). The Guardian: China's main union is yet to earn its job. *China Labour*

Bulletin. <http://www.clb.org.hk/en/node/101085>)

Dreyer, I. (2010, January 7). What the EU South Korea Free Trade Agreement Reveals About the State

of EU Trade Policy. [http://www.ecipe.org/blog/what-the-eu-south-korea-free-trade-agreement-](http://www.ecipe.org/blog/what-the-eu-south-korea-free-trade-agreement-reveals-about-the-state-of-eu-trade-policy)

[reveals-about-the-state-of-eu-trade-policy](http://www.ecipe.org/blog/what-the-eu-south-korea-free-trade-agreement-reveals-about-the-state-of-eu-trade-policy)

Economy, E. (2005, August). China's Rise in Southeast Asia: implications for the United States. *Journal*

of Contemporary China, 14(44), 409–425.

Fighting FTAs: the experience in Thailand. (2007, October). *FTA Watch*.

<http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article15240>

- Frutiger, D. (2002). AFL-CIO China Policy: Labor's New Step Forward or the Cold War Revisited? *Labor Studies*, 27(3), 67-80.
- FTA Watch. (2007, October). Fighting FTAs: the experience in Thailand.
<http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article15240>
- Global Labor University (2011, May 9). *Where is the Trade Union Reform and Labour Legislation in China heading to?* <http://column.global-labour-university.org/2011/01/where-is-trade-union-reform-and-labour.html>
- Green Party of New Zealand (2008, April 9). *General Debate - Free Trade Agreement with China*.
<http://www.greens.org.nz/speeches/general-debate-free-trade-agreement-china>
- Hall, M. (2011, Jun 14). First Step in China Trade Policy—Stop Currency Manipulation. *American Federation of Labor - Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO)*
<http://blog.aflcio.org/2011/06/14/first-step-in-china-trade-policy-stop-currency-manipulation/>
- Hampton, P (2004) The Marxist policy on trade. *Workers' Liberty*.
<http://www.workersliberty.org/node/1970>
- Hsiao, H. H. M. and Yang, A. (2008, Dec 4). Ins and outs of a China courtship. *Asia Times*.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/JL04Ae02.html
- Hu, Hao and Levesque, Christian (2011) The Role of MNCs in Reshaping Employment Relations in China, in Blackett and Levesque (eds) *Social Regionalism in the Global Economy*. (London: Routledge)
- Hung, H. (2009). *China and the Transformation of Global Capitalism*. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press).
- Hwang, I.-S. (2010, February 5). Changes in the Global Economy and Responses after the Crisis. *Samsung Economic Research Institute (SERI) Monthly Focus*, 1, 1-12.

<http://www.seriworld.org/01/wldISSUEV.html?mn=B&mncd=0203&key=20091224000001§no=>

Hyun-chul, B. (2011, April 24). 방현철위안화 무역결제 1년새 20배 폭증... 주요 도시 허브(거래 중심지) 경쟁. http://biz.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/04/24/2011042401167.html

Hyun-jung, Y. (2010). 유현정. 중국-아세안 FTA 전면발효와우리의대응방안. 정세와 정책 2010년 2월호. http://www.sejong.org/Pub_ci/PUB_CI_DATA/k2010-02_4.PDF

International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) (2008, January). *A Trade Union Guide. Trade Unions and Bilaterals: Do's and Don'ts*. <http://www.gurn.info/en/topics/bilateral-and-regional-trade-agreements/bilateral-and-regional-trade-agreements-1/background/leaflet-trade-unions-and-bilaterals>

International Conference of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) (2002, November 29). *ICFTU China Policy*. <http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?Index=991217172&Language=EN>

Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) (2011, October). 2011 JETRO Global Trade and Investment Report: International Business as a Catalyst for Japan's Reconstruction (Presentation document). http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/reports/white_paper/trade_invest_2011_outline.pdf

JTUC (no date) RENGO's View on the Issue of Foreign Workers. <http://www.jtuc-rengo.org/specialtopics/foreignworkers03.html>

Kang, C.-H. (강충호 2005) (한국노총 대외협력본부 국장) 지역별 경제협력체의 확산과 노동조합의 대응: 동아시아 지역을 중심으로. www.inochong.org

- KCTU (2005). 전국민주노동총연합 신자유주의 세계화반대민중행동. 하반기 반세계화투쟁 워크숍
- Kelsey, J. (21 November, 2011). TPP and US Anti-China Strategy, Conclusions: The TPPA As A
Lynchpin Of The US Anti-China Strategy. *Scoop New Zealand News*.
<http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO1111/S00589/tpp-and-us-anti-china-strategy-conclusions.htm>
- Klare, M. T. & Pavilionis, P. (2009). Resource Competition in the New International Order, in I. W.
Zartman (Ed), *Imbalance of Power: US Hegemony and International Order*. (Boulder: Lynne
Rienner Publishers).
- Korean Conference of Trade Unions (KCTU) (2007, December 14). CLC-KCTU Joint Statement on
Canada Korea Trade Negotiations. http://kctu.org/?mid=documents&page=2&document_srl=3239
- Korean International Labour Foundation (KOILAF) (2006, September 25). 중국 노동계약법 관련
세미나 개최, 큰 관심 끌어. *KOILAF News*.
[http://www.koilaf.org/KFkor_new/korPress/bbs_read_dis.php?board_no=172&page=24&keyField
=&keyWord=&keyCode1=](http://www.koilaf.org/KFkor_new/korPress/bbs_read_dis.php?board_no=172&page=24&keyField=&keyWord=&keyCode1=)
- Labour's Platform for the Americas (LPA) (August 2005). Lee, C.-H., (2010, July). Yu Yongding on
Global Economy and China's Place. *Samsung Economic Research Institute (SERI) Quarterly*, 3(3),
pp. 72-82. www.seriquarterly.com
- Lee, J.-K., Jung, H.-S. & Yang, O.-S. (2010, November 23). Korea-EU FTA and Corporate Response
[Issue Report 10-06]. Samsung Economic Research Institute (SERI).
[http://www.seriworld.org/01/wldISSUEV.html?mn=B&mncd=0203&key=20101123000001§
no=](http://www.seriworld.org/01/wldISSUEV.html?mn=B&mncd=0203&key=20101123000001§no=)

- Lee, S.-H. (2010, December). China's New Promising Industries. *Management Report*.
<http://www.seriworld.org/01/wldContV.html?&mn=B&mncd=0101&key=20101208000001&pubkey=20101208000001&seq=20101208000001&kdy=E5JjH5a6=§no=3>
- Li, P. (2011). China's New Stage of Development. *China: An International Journal*, 9(1), 133-143.
- Liu, F.-k. (2008, May 16). China's embrace leaves US in cold. *Asia Times*.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/JE16Cb01.html
- Luce, S. & Bonacich, E. (2009). China and the U.S. Labor Movement. In H. Hung (Ed.), *China and the Transformation of Global Capitalism*. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press).
- McNally, D (2011) *Global Slump: the Economics and Politics of Crisis and Resistance*.
- Mighell, D. (2009). Electrical Trades Union. <http://www.etu.asn.au/>
- Mighell, D. (2009, September). The 'China advantage' What price a free trade agreement with China? Consumer and Public Interest (CPI) Strategic [Commissioned by the Victorian Branch of the Electrical Trades Union].
http://aftinet.org.au/cms/sites/default/files/china_freetrade_report_Final_Sept09.pdf
- Morrison, Wayne M (2011) *China-US Trade Issues*. Congressional Research Service. www.crs.gov
- Murphy, K. (2009, February 20). China FTA needed: Crean. *The Age*.
<http://www.theage.com.au/business/china-fta-needed-crean-20090219-8cl8.html>
- Park, H.-S. (2010, April 29). 'Post-Crisis New Normal Looms for the Global Economy.' *Samsung Economic Research Institute (SERI) Monthly Focus*, 4, 1-11.
<http://www.seriworld.org/01/wldISSUEV.html?mn=B&mncd=0203&key=20100429000001§no>
- Park, M (forthcoming) 'Imagining a Just and Sustainable Society: A Critique of Alternative Economic Models in the Global Justice Movement.' *Critical Sociology*.

- Park, M. (2009) 'Framing Free Trade Agreements: the politics of nationalism in the anti-neoliberal globalization movement in South Korea.' *Globalizations*, Volume 6 Issue 4, 451.
- Parks, J. (2011, Jun 17). Revaluing China's Currency Would Create 2.25 Million U.S. Jobs. *American Federation of Labor - Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO)*
<http://blog.aflcio.org/2011/06/17/revaluing-chinas-currency-would-create-2-25-million-u-s-jobs/>
- Perkowski (2011) China To The Rescue In Africa, Asia And Europe.
<http://www.forbes.com/sites/jackperkowski/2011/10/31/china-to-the-rescue-in-africa-asia-and-europe/>
- Phillips, N. (2010). China and Latin America: Development Challenges and Geopolitical Dilemmas, in L. Dittmer, L., & G. T. Yu (Eds.), *China, the Developing World, and the New Global Dynamic* (pp. 177-201). (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers).
- Pomfret, R. (2007). Is regionalism an increasing feature of the world economy? *World Economy*, 6(6), 923-947.
- Qingfen, D. (2011, March, 16). Integration of Asian economies will provide greater benefits. *China Daily*. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2011bfa/2011-03/16/content_12317623.htm
- Rana, P. B. (2007). Economic integration and synchronization of business cycles in East Asia. *Journal of Asian Economics*, 18, 711–725.
- Rifkin, J. (2004) *The end of work: the decline of the global labor force and the dawn of the post-market era*. (New York, Jeremy P. Tarcher/Penguin).
- RT (18 November, 2011) 'Yuan to replace dollar in 10 years.' <http://rt.com/usa/news/dollar-china-yuan-sea-703/>

- Scipes, K. (2006, July 3). When Will the AFL-CIO Leadership Quit Blaming the Chinese Government for Multinational Corporate Decisions, U.S. Government Policies, and U.S. Labor Leaders' Inept Responses? *Monthly Review*. <http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/scipes030706.html>
- Senser, R. A. (2011, June 30). China's Labor Organization is 'evolving,' says Han Dongfang. *Human Rights for Workers*. <http://humanrightsforworkers.blogspot.com/2011/06/chinas-labor-organization-acftu-is.html>
- Smith, B., Brecher, J. & Costello, T. (2006, October 5). *China's Emerging Labor Movement*. <http://www.commondreams.org/views06/1005-30.htm>
- Solidarity Center, AFL-CIO (2008) Justice For all. A Guide to workers rights in the global economy. http://www.solidaritycenter.org/files/pubs_jfa2009.pdf
- Solis, Mireya (2011) Last Train for Asia-Pacific Integration? U.S. Objectives in the TPP Negotiations. Waseda University Organization for Japan-US Studies. Working Paper No. 201102
- Subramanian, A. (2011). *Eclipse: living in the shadow of China's economic dominance*. (Washington, DC, Peterson Institute for International Economics).
- Bloomberg (Dec 28, 2011) China-Japan Currency Deal Points Way to New Monetary Order: View. <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-29/china-japan-currency-deal-points-way-to-a-new-world-monetary-order-view.html>
- Sun-uk, J. (2008). 정선욱.(2008) 미국 노동운동진영 내에 부는 중국 바람(風). *International Labour Trends*, 3, 77-82. <http://222.110.238.9/pub/docu/kr/AI/06/AI062008MAJ/AI06-2008-MAJ-010.PDF>

Suwarni, Y. T. (2010, January 7). Thousands rally to demand delay of ASEAN-China FTA. *The Jakarta Post*. <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/01/07/thousands-rally-demand-delay-aseanchina-fta.html>

Thousands rally against free trade treaty in Surabaya, Semarang (2010, January 21). *The Jakarta Post*. <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/01/21/thousands-rally-against-free-trade-treaty-surabaya-semarang.html>

Tussie, D. (2008). Developmental Opposition in International Trade Regimes: Regional Groupings and State and Civil Society Coalitions, in D. B. Bobrow (Ed.), *Hegemony Constrained: Evasion, Modification, and Resistance to American Foreign Policy*. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press).

Wang, V. (2009, August 26). China trade pact carries price-tag query. *Asia Times*. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/KH26Cb01.html

Xinhua (2011, March 4). East Asia's economic integration to be sped up. *China Daily*. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2011-03/04/content_12118251.htm

Xinhua (2011, May 31). ASEAN becomes ROK's 2nd largest trade partner. *China Daily*. http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2011-05/31/content_12621063.htm

Yonhapnews (2011, June 25). 연합뉴스) 유철종 특파원 = 러시아 중앙은행과 중국 인민은행이 상호 교역에서 양국 통화를 결제 수단으로 이용하는 협정을 체결했다고 러시아 중앙은행이 24 일 밝혔다.

<http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2011/06/25/0200000000AKR20110625060900080.HTML>

- Yu, G. T. (2010). China's Africa Policy: South-South Unity and Cooperation, in L. Dittmer & G. T. Yu (eds.), *China, the Developing World, and the New Global Dynamic*. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.)
- Yu, H.-J. (2010). 유현정. 중국-아세안 FTA 전면발효와우리의대응방안. 정세와 정책 2010 년 2 월호. http://www.sejong.org/Pub_ci/PUB_CI_DATA/k2010-02_4.PDF
- Yue, C. S. (2006, March 28). ASEAN-China Economic Competition and Free Trade Area. *Asian Economic Papers*, 4(1), 109-147.
- Zartman, I. W. (2009). *Imbalance of Power: US Hegemony and International Order*. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers).
- Zattler. (2010) A Possible New Role for Special Drawing Rights In and Beyond the Global Monetary System, in Dullien et al. (eds) *The Financial and Economic Crisis of 2008-2009 and Developing Countries*.
- Zweig, D. (2010). The Rise of a New "Trading Nation". In L. Dittmer, L., & G. T. Yu (Eds.), *China, the Developing World, and the New Global Dynamic*. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers).
- 한국무역협회 (KITA) (2007, June 1). 발효! 한-ASEAN 자유무역협정(FTA) 거대경제권과 맺은 첫 FTA. http://www.kita.net/new_fta/user/new_user/fta_info/kor_status_view.jsp?idx=19